One explanation for Genna v. Jackson (a new opinion out of the Michigan Court of Appeals) and Gass v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc is that the courts thought about it and decided to shift the burden of proof regarding causation to the defendant any time a plaintiff suffers an injury that is consistent with the possible harm, as set out on a warning label or MSDS, associated with a potentially toxic material. In Genna the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant in part because "[h]ere, like in Gass, defendant has not submitted any scientific evidence that the mold in her condominium could not have cause [sic] plaintiffs' injuries." In Gass the 6th Circuit noted "Defendants have offered no evidence to refute the MSDS's representation of Demand CS as a chemical which could have caused Plaintiffs' symptoms". The court later continued saying "[p]laintiffs are not required to produce expert testimony on causation where Defendants have failed to offer scientific evidence regarding the effects of Demand CS or Suspend SC."
The Genna court concluded, on the issue of causation, "[t]his is not a complicated case: the children were sick, the children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and the children recovered." Noting evidence that there was lots of mold and that mold in general had been reported to cause some of "the types of symptoms suffered by the children" the court concluded [i]t does not take an expert to conclude that, under these circumstances, defendant more likely than not is responsible for plaintiffs' injuries." (citing Gass). "Here, there was ample circumstantial evidence that would "facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation."
Under this view of an unannounced burden-shifting approach taken by these two courts it appears that in Michigan if a plaintiff develops ailments consistent with a those listed on a product's label or MSDS the jury is free to infer causation even in the absence of evidence of what dose produces those ailments and what dose plaintiff suffered and even in the absence of an expert to opine that the product in question caused the harm at issue.
Another explanation for these cases is that Michigan does not require toxic tort plaintiffs to show what some call specific causation - a concept common in cases in which causal inferences are derived from epidemiological evidence. The idea is that when dealing with an illness that has been associated with multiple causes, among which is the chemical at issue, the plaintiff must show that the putative cause was more likely than not the cause in fact of his illness. Evidence for this view can be found in the following passage from Genna: "Defendant urges this Court to adopt the requirement that, in order to prove causation in a toxic tort case, a plaintiff must show both that the alleged toxin is capable of causing injuries like those suffered by the plaintiff in human beings subjected to the same exposure as the plaintiff, and that the toxin was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. They urge this Court to find that direct expert testimony be required to establish the causal link, not inferences. We decline to adopt this requirement. There is no published Michigan case law on the subject."
A final explanation is that more attention to Aristotle's Rhetoric is needed. As Chief Judge Boggs, dissenting in Gass wrote the problem here is the logical fallacy behind post hoc, ergo propter hoc causal inferences such as those suggested by the plaintiffs in Genna and Gass. "It is the fallacy of saying that because effect A happened at some point after alleged cause B, the alleged cause was the actual cause. Such logic has never been enough to survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Abbott v. Federal Forge, ("[P]ost hoc, ergo propter hoc is not a rule of legal causation.") 912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir.1990).
Equally importantly Chief Judge Boggs understands that lay juries are in no position to judge whether there has been a breach of the duty of care without evidence of what levels are harmful and the levels to which plaintiffs were actually exposed. If you don't know the dose you can't know what risk, if any, the defendant imposed on the plaintiff. He wrote: "Thus presented, the question is whether the plaintiffs needed expert testimony in this case to prove how much chemical exposure is too much chemical exposure or to prove whether the amount of exposure actually caused the alleged harmful consequence. In my view, the majority pays too little attention to this issue, rushing from the fact of exposure and odd symptoms to the legal conclusion of fault." He continued: "As I understand it, these cases require expert testimony in complex, professional, or scientific-based negligence cases in order to limit the dangers associated with indulging the post hoc impulse: it is too easy to charge an uncommon harm to the presence of a mysterious substance. Properly credentialed expert testimony operates as a bulwark against such fallacious attribution of guilt. As in the Daubert context, our concern in applying these cases should be to "assure that the powerful engine of tort liability ... points towards the right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones." General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148-49, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (Breyer, J. concurring).
Whatever the explanation these cases will be a boon for Michigan toxic tort plaintiffs.
